East Front Drama 1944: German view of Operation Bagration

In June 1944, the Russian Army launched "Operation Bagration", the largest offensive in military history—eclipsing even D-Day in its enormity. In a matter of days, a hole hundreds of miles wide was torn in the German front and Army Group Center was destroyed, with more than 300,000 casualties—the most costly German defeat of WW2. East Front Drama is a meticulous examination of how the German forces on the Eastern Front, under the direction of Hitler’s favorite Field Marshall—Walter Model—recovered from this shattering defeat. Rolf Hinze is one of Germany’s leading military historians and has covered this little known topic in meticulous fashion with detailed unit movements, analysis of command decisions and superb maps.

On 22/23 June 1944 the Soviets launched “Operation Bagration” -- on the anniversary of Operation "Barbarossa" -- against the forces of Heeresgruppe Mitte. The Soviet forces on the attack axis consisted of 2 tank armies, 8 armored/mechanized corps (for a total of more than 4,000 tanks) and 168 rifle (infantry) divisions. These forces were supported by 31,000 guns and mortars and more than 5,000 aircraft. The Germans were outnumbered by more than 3:1 in troops at the point of attack; 3.5:1 in artillery and 5:1 in aircraft.

Due to the strategically inept grouping of German elements in “fortified” cities and the nonsensical “hold fast” order, the Soviets had advanced some 200 kilometers within a week and torn a gap of 400 kilometers in the German lines. The German casualties numbered more than 200,000. On 28 June 1944, Field Marshal Model took over command from the overtaxed and incapable Field Marshal Busch.

Rolf Hinze’s book is a meticulously researched account of how the Germans under Model organized an astounding recovery from the initial massive assault; retreating in more-or-less good order and eventually slowing down the Soviet offensive operations, although the Soviets outrunning their supply lines was also a significant factor. The author documents the movement of the German formations and units (often to company level!) aided by 37 detailed maps, and the appendices include various orders of battle for Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Very little has been published in English on the German recovery from the destruction of Heeresgruppe Mitte and Hinze’s book admirably fills this gap in World War 2 history.

Example of Text
13. Intermediate Commitment of the 19th Panzer Division
On the following day Kuznica and Kawale were lost. General Hossbach - General von Tippelskirch's deputy who was injured in an aircraft accident - decided to divert the 19th Panzer Division from its original attack axis and direct its attack through Kuznica to the southeast to guard against the danger of the right flank of the 4th Army being cut off. It had to turn back on a line east of the bend in the Sokolka - Kuznica railroad around the Biebrza - Lipsk sector. Field Marshal Model agreed with Hossbach's decision, with the incorporation of Group von Gottberg on the line Sokolka - Kuznica - Lipsk and the capture of the terminal line Sokolka - Kuznica - Karolin - Lipsk during the night of 22 to 23/7. The attack of the 19th Panzer Division was to begin as soon as possible on this day.

The planned attack to the north through Lipsk, and the closing of the Augustow Forest to the rear, could not be started by the 19th Panzer Division on schedule because they were still lacking their heavy weapons. A battle group of the 27th Panzer Regiment of the 19th Panzer Division was dispatched on the basis of a report that thirty enemy tanks - followed by motorized infantry and artillery - were advancing on Dabrowa in the direction of Grodno. The appearance of the tanks and powerful supporting forces of the group threw the Soviets into panic and the entire artillery battalion was lost as it slipped sideward into the marshland. The battle group took Grodno, then changed course to the south on the basis of new orders, either to Kuznica or Bialystock. This short commitment of a freshly equipped panzer division showed what great combat power a well-rested troop could generate - in contrast to the exhausted infantry and panzer divisions of the army group, that had been already committed for weeks. The number of enemy tanks destroyed or captured by the commitment of the battle group of the 19th Panzer Division at Grodno cannot be firmly established. The estimate is 180, a portion of which were arrayed in the market place where friendly tanks caught them by surprise.

Another battle group of the 19th Panzer Division (predominantly the 74th Panzergrenadier Regiment) followed the first battle group out of Augustow and captured Lipsk which was already occupied by the enemy at this time (21/7), and penetrated into enemy occupied Dabrowa during the evening. A portion of this battle group, namely the lead element in the march column, the 6/PAR 19, the 19th Panzer Pionier Abteilung and one scout troop, which was securing to the east, had to be rushed in the direction of Grodno, in order to facilitate the disengagement of the first battle group of the 19th Panzer Division, the 27th Panzer Regiment, from the enemy.

The 27th Battle Group was able to withdraw and utilize the road to Sokolka unhindered. The rear guard, including the 6/PAR 19, was fired on from the railroad embankment directly south of Grodno. They swung further to the west returning to the second battle group of the 19th Panzer Division, namely the 74th Panzergrenadier Regiment.

Therefore, it appeared the fate of the Augustow "Plague Boil" was decided. The initial maneuver to strangle this wedge had shown some success but could not be completed, due to the necessity of withdrawing the troops to other commitment locations. Thus the Soviets could henceforth execute their plans through Augustow unopposed.

Table of Contents
I. Foreword. General Data: 1. The War Situation; 2. The Reaction of the Troops to the Attempted Assassination of Hitler; 3. The Relations of the Troops with the Population; 4. The Attitude of the Troops to Enemy Propaganda; 5. Views on the Activities of the "National Committees"; 6. The Attitude of the Troops; 7. Soviet Tactics and German Reactions; 8. The Development of the Situation Before the Reporting Period; 9. The Initial Situation

Field Marshal Model Takes Command: 1. The Commitment of the "Bergen Blocking Formation"; 2. The Creation of "Battle Group Lindig"; 3. Assessment of the Situation around Marina Gorka by the Commander of the 9th Army; 4. The Situation of "Group Lindig"; 5. Considerations on the Commitment of the 12th Panzer Division; 6. Relief Attack of the 12th Panzer Division; 7. Situation Development in the Rear of "Group Lindig"; 8. The Retreat of "Group Lindig"; 9. Termination of "Combat Group Lindig's" Mission (12th PzD); 10. Results of the Lack of Situational Information; 11. Withdrawal of "Group Lindig" with the 12th Panzer Division as Rear Guard; 12. Mission of the 4th Army; 13. Forward Detachment of the 12th Panzer Division; 14. Commitment of the 12th Panzer Division in Stolpce; 15. Important Decision for the 12th Panzer Division; 16. The 12th Panzer Division Crosses the Nieman

II. Section II: 1. Situation Assessment; 2. Withdrawal of the Right Flank of the 9th Army; 2a. The Route of the 35th ID of the XXXXI Panzer Corps; 2b. The Route of the 129th ID of the LV Army Corps; 2c. The Route of the 292nd ID of the LV Army Corps; 3. Subsequent Situation Assessment; 4. Tactical Considerations; 5. Exchange of Ideas between the Army Group and the OKH; 6. Troop Requirements; 7. Tightening of Command and Control; 8. The Initial Far-reaching Tactical Decision to Fill the German Frontal Gaps

III. The North Flank of Army Group Center (3rd Panzer Army): 1. The Delaying Defensive Combat of the 3rd Panzer Army; 2. Further Defensive Combat of the 3rd Panzer Army; 3. Further Advance of the Soviet Forces; 4. Further Withdrawal of the IXth Army Corps; 5. Continuation of the Encirclement of Vilna; 6. Group Tolsdorf; 7. The Situation in and around Vilna; 8. The Battle for Vilna; 9. Additional Relief Attempts; 10. New Halt Order; 11. The Final Battle for Vilna; 12. Contradictions in Tactical Planning; 13. Weakening of the Defense of "Fortress" Vilna; 14. Measures to Extricate the Troops; 15. Breakout from "Fortress" Vilna; 16. Further Situation Development; 17. Attempt to Close the "Baltic Gaps"; 18. The Bargaining for Troops; 19. Plans to Close the "Baltic Gaps"; 20. Measures to Block the Vilna Gap; 21. Fate of Individual Troop Units

IV. The 4th Army Area of Operations: 1. The Left Flank of the 4th Army (XXXIX Panzer Corps); 2. Battle Group Lendle; 3. Battle Group Metz; 4. Additional Soviet Attacks On Lida; 5. Attack on Olita; 6. Battle for Grodno; 7. Command Thoughts; 8. Combat on the Nieman Front; 9. The Southern Sector of the 4th Army (Blocking Group Weidling); 10. Führer Decision; 11. Combat in the Augustow Forest; 12. Assignment for the 19th Panzer Division; 13. Intermediate Commitment of the 19th Panzer Division; 14. The Kuznica Front Sector; 15. The Weakening of the 4th Army; 16. Commitment Reports of the Individual Divisions

V. The Southern Sector of Army Group Center (2nd Army):

A. Left Flank of the 2nd Army; 1. Soviet Plans; 2. German Tactical Considerations; 3. The Situation around Sluzk; 4. The Formation of "Group Harteneck"; 5 Available Troops; 6. Field Marshal Model's Plans; 7. The Enemy Situation; 8. Tactical Considerations; 9. The Forward Deployment of Troops on Both Sides; 10. The Development of the Situation left of the Brest-Sluzk Rollbahn; 11. Attempt to Attack in the Direction of Stolpce (Skopce); 12. Defensive Combat in the Nieswiez, Timkovichi, Stolpce Area; 13. The Insertion of the 1st Royal Hungarian Cavalry Division into the Corps Positions; 14. Further Commitment of Hungarian Troops; 15. Further Defensive Combat of Corps Harteneck; 16. New Commitment Tactic; 17. Breakdown of the Available Troops; 18. Attempt to Create a Defensive Line along the Baranowicze-Luniniec Railroad; 19. The Withdrawal of the Corps Defensive Line; 20. Surprise Attack on the Corps Command Post; 21. Further Withdrawal Combat; 22. Combat Before Baranowicze on the Right of the Rollbahn; 23. Preparation to Defend the Baranowicze Heights; 24. Dismantling the Baranowicze Defense, Withdrawal to the Myszanka Sector; 150 . Withdrawal from and around Baranowicze to the Szczara Line; 26. Initial Order for the LV Army Corps to Establish a Defensive Line on the Nieman; 27. Attempt to Form a Defensive Line on the Usza; 28. Movement into the Area North of Baranowicze; 29. Dependence of the Situation Development on the Soviet Advance South of Baranowicze; 30. Withdrawal to the Szczara; 31. Crossing over the Molczadz; 32. Further Withdrawal of the 12th Panzer Division; 33. Withdrawal of the 28th Light Infantry Division to the Szczara Line; 34. The General Situation of the 2nd Army

B. The Right Flank of the 2nd Army; I. The Pripet Region; 2. The Main Combat Line on the Right Flank of the 2nd Army; 3. Partisan Development; 4. Initial Mission of the XXIII Army Corps; 5. New Employment of the 292nd ID; 6. The Southern Front of the XXIII Army Corps; 7. Assimilation and Further Control of the Divisions of the LV Army Corps and XLI Army Corps; 8. Utilization of the Divisions of the LV Army Corps; 9. Reconnaissance of the Hungarian Hussar Regiment; 10. Soviet Attack on Bostyn; 11. Corps Harteneck's Attack to Close the Gap; 12. The Gap Between "Corps Harteneck" and "Group Thiemann"; 13. Retreat of the 292nd ID; 14. Withdrawal of Additional Units of the XXIII Army Corps; 15. Transfer of the Divisions of the XXIII Army Corps to the Control of the XX Army Corps; 16. The Mission of the XX Army Corps; 17. Evacuation of the "Pinsk Salient"; 18. Further Retreat of the XX Army Corps;

VI. Further Developments in the 3rd Panzer Army Area of Operations: 1. New Mission for the 3rd Panzer Army; 2. Right Flank of the 3rd Panzer Army; 3. Center Sector of the 3rd Panzer Army; 4. Situation Assessment; 5. Further Defensive Combat; 6. Extension of the Left Flank; 7. Preparation for the Soviet Attack in the Direction of Kovno; 8. The Soviet Attack in the Direction of Kovno; 9. Extension of the Left Flank of the Army; 10. Development of the Situation; 11. Troop Replenishment to Close the "Baltic Gaps"; 12. Soviet Advance on Both Sides of Kovno; 13. Battle for Kovno; 14. The Situation on the Right Flank of the 3rd Panzer Army; 15. Combat West of Kovno (Kauen); 16. The Left Flank of the Army Group; 17. Combat in the Wilkowishken Area; 18. Situation on the Left Flank of the Panzer Army; 19. The Situation in the 3rd Panzer Army Sector; 20. Individual Division Commitments

VII. Withdrawal Battle of the Southern Flank of Army Group Center

A. Attempts to Establish a Defensive Line: 1. The Declining Combat Strength of the German Formations; 2. Influence of Partisan Activity; 3. Command and Control Measures; 4. The Fruitless Attempts to Establish a Defensive Line; 5. The Soviet Subsequent Objective; 6. The Shifting of the Soviet Main Effort; 7. Attack to and across the. Zelwianka Sector; 8. Attempt of the XXIII Army Corps to Establish a Defense Between the XX Army Corps and Corps Harteneck

B. The Withdrawal Battle of the 2nd Army: 1. New Missions for the 2nd Army; 2. Retreat of the XX Army Corps; 3. Further Withdrawal Combat of the XX Army Corps, with Troop Surrender; Defensive Combat of Corps Harteneck and the LV Army Corps

C. The General Situation: 1. The Army Group's Estimate of the Enemy Situation; 2. Beginning of the Major Attack against Army Group North Ukraine

D. Preparation for the Soviet Breakthrough into the Depth: 1. Penetration into the Bialowiezer Forest; 2. Widening the Gap in the Front; 3. Diversionary Attack to Secure the Assigned Breakthrough into the Depth

E. Soviet Deployment in the Bialowiezer Forest: 1. The General Situation; 2. Soviet Preparations to Assemble in the Bialowiezer Forest; 3. Securing the Assembly by Diversionary Attacks; 4. Defense Against the Soviet Diversionary Attacks from the Point of View of the Divisions; 5. Countermeasures against Soviet Cavalry Formations Advancing to the West

F. The Breakout of the Soviet 65th Army from the Bialowiezer Forest: 1. Development of the Situation In and Around the Forest up to 18/7/44; 2. Soviet Containment and Flanking Attacks on 17 and 18/7/44; 3. The Initial Soviet Situation on the Evening of 18/7/44; 4. The' Soviet Breakout and Advance on 19/7/44; 5. Additional Frontal Combat of the XXIII Army Corps; 6. Combat Around the Bug Bridgehead; 7. Establishment of a Defensive Line on the Bug; 8. Commitment of Group Reichert 20 to 21/7/44; 9. The Situation on the Western Front of the XXIII Army Corps on 24/7/44; 10. The Attack of the 541st ID out of the Fronolow Bridgehead (25/7/44)

G. Additional Blocking Attempts in the Bielsk Podlaski ­ Kleszczele - Czeremcha Penetration Area: 1. Commitment of Cavalry Corps Harteneck from 19 to 22/7/44; 2. The Two-sided Attack on Kleszczele (23/7/44)

H. The Battle for "Fortress" Brest-Litovsk: 1. The Situation around Brest; 2. The Confinement of "Fortress" Brest-Litovsk; 3. The Situation West of Brest-Litovsk; 4. The Encirclement of "Fortress" Brest; 5. The End of "Fortress" Brest; 6. Breakout of "Group Fetzmann"

I. The Southern Front of the 2nd Army: 1. The Situation on the Southern Flank of the Army Group; 2. The New Soviet Attack Direction from the South and the North; 3. Situation of "Group von Roman"; 4. Advance Against the Southern Front; 5. Situation Estimate; 6. Soviet Advance on Warsaw; 7. The Tactical Importance of Warsaw; 8. German Defensive Attempts Southeast of Warsaw; 9. The Situation on the Southern Flank of the Army Group; 10. Renewed Attempts to Close the Gap Between the 2nd Army and the 9th Army; 11. Establishing Contact Between the 2nd Army and the 9th Army; 12. Defeat of the Lead Soviet Attack Elements East of Warsaw; 13. Soviet Diversionary Operations; 14. Establishment of a German Defensive Front East of Warsaw; 15. Reports of Individual Divisions

VIII. Summary

Appendices

Bibliography


Rolf Hinze. Hardcover, small format (9"x6"), 360 pages, 100 photographs, 50 maps.